The established global trend in reducing numbers of aircraft accidents and incidents at airports appears to be under threat. Could stronger safety leadership and accountability improve safety performance? This article discusses some of the background, technology and procedural standards and recommended practices adopted at ICAO more than a decade ago and intended to enhance safety and efficiency. To be effective this ICAO guidance requires action and adoption by Regulators, Airports, ANSPs and OEMs. This article also proposes three new measures that could help to accelerate and drive positive change.
Safety Trends
2024 was marred by truly shocking aircraft accidents, resulting in multiple fatalities. In other close calls, the passengers and crews involved in incidents have narrowly escaped disaster. The number of minor ground collisions appears to be growing too, almost every week our news feeds are filled with images of aircraft colliding with other aircraft or vehicles on the ramp. 2025, just a few weeks in, has continued that same alarming trend.
How is it in 2025, given the advances in technology and the safety imperatives of air transport, that an aircraft traveling at high speed can collide with another aircraft or vehicle on a runway. Elsewhere on the airport why is it that aircraft are still colliding with aircraft or vehicles when manoeuvring on apron areas and taxiways?
Air Transport safety is a global success story. Great strides in safety have accompanied relentless increases in air travel over decades. Even so, recent trends remind us all that as an industry, we can and must do a better job of identifying and eliminating the associated safety risks and potential solutions.
Why, given the advances in technology, procedures and regulations are we still seeing what are apparently basic failings in safety assurance? What more can be done by Regulators, Airport and Aircraft Operators, or Air Navigation Service Provider to further reduce safety risks?
It is not appropriate or the purpose of this article to speculate on the causes of aircraft accidents still subject to investigation, but we can use the lessons of history to spot trends and focus on additional remedial measures.
History Lessons
History identifies what is still the world’s worst air disaster, the collision of two B747 in fog on the ground at Tenerife North in March 1977, which killed more people than any other air accident. Yet with the use of Surface Movement Radar technology in use elsewhere at the time that the accident was potentially avoidable. We know too that a collision with ground equipment in October 2000, during the take-off roll of a B747 from Taipei should not have happened, the aircraft taxying in poor weather used a runway for take-off that had been closed for maintenance but the error was undetected by either the tower or pilot until it was too late. In October 2001 another fatal ground collision, a MD87 attempting to take-off from Milan’s Linate Airport collided with a business jet that had misrouted on to the runway in fog, killing all on board both aircraft. Each of these collisions occurred in poor visibility, and at airports not equipped with operating Surface Movement Radar (SMR), even though it was already in use at airports elsewhere. The use of SMR might have alerted Air Traffic Controllers on the day to the unfolding disaster in sufficient time to take remedial action. We will never know, but the undetected error trend jumps off the page. Note too that the pilots involved were relying on voice communication and an out of the window view; a feature of more recent accidents.
In the January 2024 accident at Tokyo Haneda, neither the pilots nor Air Traffic Controller involved were apparently aware of the impending collision involving a landing aircraft with another waiting for departure. This took place at night and in good visibility. Similarly In February 2025, just a few days ago a Boeing 737 Max 8, attempting to take-off at night in good visibility at Rio de Janeiro, struck a maintenance vehicle on the runway. Again, neither pilots, controllers or vehicle driver were apparently aware of the conflict and risk.
And yet, any member of the public can today, through use of a smartphone and a Flight Tracking App, see in near real time, the location, movement and identity of aircraft, and vehicles equipped with electronic conspicuity, at all medium and large commercial airports in the world.
Surely, Policy makers and Regulators have taken steps to make use of these surveillance and warning capabilities to enhance the safety and efficiency of airport surface operations to provide pilots and controllers with access to such information and their associated warning systems? Yes of course they have. Has that led to the widespread delivery and adoption of these solutions? Probably not! Is use of that technology mandatory? No.
Technology Solutions
Airport Surface Movement, Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) have been defined and available for many years using Surface Movement Radar and Multilateration (MLAT). A-SMGCS continues to advance and improve, it now includes sophisticated digital surveillance systems such as ADS-B, cameras and radar. These can enable Conflict Detection, Situational Awareness and Clearance compliance checking, runway incursion warning systems (RIWS), follow the greens (FTG) and associated digital safety nets. A-SMGCS at its most sophisticated can also include automatic planning and guidance for controllers and for cockpit display of traffic and taxiway routings for pilots.
The ICAO Global Air Navigation Plan adopted the Aviation System Block Upgrade system setting out the Standards and Recommended Practices in 2013, incorporating these capabilities. Not enough has happened since, too many pilots and controllers are still not able to assure through use of digital surveillance that runways are clear and safe to use. Why?
Probably the most recent interpretation on this ICAO guidance can be found in the 2025 European ATM Masterplan which guides the policies, strategies, technical and procedural adaptations needed. But even this applies just to states in Europe, less than a quarter of ICAO’s global membership.
Regulatory Tools
The status quo relies on a system of national regulators developing regulations and policies that reflect national priorities and the Standards and Recommended Practices agreed by their governments at ICAO. The resulting national frameworks may or may not be expeditiously implemented by ANSP’s, Airports, Airlines and Aircraft manufacturers. Either way, the system has sometimes failed to deliver the outcomes that help to ensure and improve operational safety. Something needs to change.
Regulators already constrain airport capacity in conditions of Low Visibility, requiring use of Low Visibility Procedures, reducing the movement rate. Regulators could introduce similar arrangements tied to the A-SMGCS capability of the airport. Aircraft Minimum Equipment Lists, already impacts the authority of the aircraft to fly. Airport Fire and Rescue category is impacted by the availability of the staff and equipment to meet that category.
Yet an airport’s runway throughput capacity is apparently not constrained by the availability or otherwise of the A-SMGCS tools in the control tower, nor the related information being available to the pilots using that airport. It could be. Both the ICAO Global Air Navigation Plan and the European ATM Masterplan contain reasonable timescales which could be applied more firmly.
Stronger Safety Leadership
The improvement of alerts to reduce the risk of collisions on runways and taxiways is already a strategic priority in Europe and beyond. History shows us that deployment and adoption of these priorities and the associated tools and procedures is sometimes optional and is usually slower than planned. Continued reliance on the established and erratic adoption of such enhancements is unlikely to significantly influence safety outcomes for the better. As an industry we are capable of better.
How Could Adoption of Improved Safety Measures be Incentivised?
Regulators could link availability of various surveillance and safety net capabilities, such as RIWS, FTG and Clearance compliance, to variable hourly runway capacity caps at airports. This could strengthen investment cases and stimulate deployments.
Airport owners and operators could take the lead in ensuring that their operation is technically and procedurally as safe as it reasonably can be. Rather than relying on ANSPs to adopt new technology in a timely manner, and on Regulatory mandates.
Pilot and controller unions could lobby for faster adoption of these digital A-SMGCS capabilities to improve safety and do more to make better situational awareness information available to pilots and controllers.
Graham Lake February 2025
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